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GARY L. ANDERSON"
I.

=

INTRODUCTION

The core of a modem criminal code is its sentencing system; therefore, a core project in a criminal code revision is sentencing reform. Among
the controversial questions presented are: What type of statutory sentencing
structure should be adopted? Who should sentence, and how much discretion should be given to the sentencing authority? What minimum and
maximum limits should the legislature place on the sentences for particular
crimes? The Committee to Draft a Modem Criminal Code dealt with
these and other sentencing questions. Some committee members and the
author believe that the Committee's major accomplishment is the development of a rational and effective sentencing system.
The basic sentencing deficiency in Missouri today is the lack of any
rationally conceived sentencing system. Existing Missouri sentencing law
has developed through piecemeal legislative revision over more than a century. The resulting diversities, anomalies and inconsistencies in sentencing
provisions scattered throughout the Revised Statutes cannot be rationally
justified; they often contribute to disparity of sentences among offenders
of comparable culpability. A modem criminal code should minimize sentencing disparity and provide the sentencing authority sufficient flexibility
to impose a sentence that fits the specific circumstances.
OEditor's note: The symposium on the Proposed Code doses with this issue.
The Review regrets that a discussion of offenses against the person under the Code
does not appear.
"Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee. Formerly Executive
Secretary, Missouri Committee for a Modem Criminal Code; B.S. Iowa State University, 1960; J.D. University of Iowa, 1962; LL.M. Harvard University, 1968.
(549)
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OF OFFENSES

Presently, Missouri does not have a rational system for the classification of crimes; each Missouri criminal statute usually contains its own
provision authorizing a specific range of penalties. The result is many different types of penalty provisions.
A. The Data
Extensive research has produced surprising data on Missouri's "nonsystem" of criminal penalties. Although there is a basic division of crimes
into felonies and misdemeanors based on the place of confinement,' there
are almost no identifiable subcategories of felonies or misdemeanors
based on similarity of authorized penalties.2 Nor are there many identifiable
subcategories among the 625 scattered penalty provisions that authorize
various kinds of fines or forfeiture penalties.3
A '"penalty type" is an authorized penalty distinct from all other penalties; it may be authorized only once or for many offenses. For example, the
penalty for manslaughter 4 is a penalty type unique to that crime. The
penalty for a crime which the statute creating it designates simply as a
1.Felonies are defined as crimes for which the offender "is liable by law to
be punished with death or imprisonment in a correctional institution of the state
department of corrections, and no other." § 556.020, RSMo 1969. Misdemeanors
include "every offense punishable only by fine or imprisonment in a county jail,
or both." § 556.040, RSMo 1969. Compare PROP. NEw Mo. CRIM. CODE § 1.030
(1973).
2. There are 353 "statutory, misdemeanors" under general § 556.270, RSMo
1969, punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year, or
by a fine not exceeding $1,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment. Section
556.270 applies to misdemeanors for which the statute creating the offense does
not specify a penalty. The next largest subcategory consists of 57 felony statutes,
each with the penalty provision, "not less than two nor more than five years." If
one takes into account only the statutes with the most frequently authorized maximum penalties, the Missouri penalties tend to fall into seven general categories.
See Tables I and II infra, in pt. II, § A of this article. Category 3 in Table I was
ignored because only two crimes are punishable by imprisonment of over 10 years
but less than 20 years (15 year maximum).
ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVE AND PROCEDURE 2.1 (a)
(Approved Draft 1968) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS] recommends:
All crimes should be classified for the purpose of sentencing into
categories which reflect substantial differences in gravity. The categories
should be very few in number. Each should specify the sentencing alterna*
tives available for offenses which fall within it. The penal codes of each
jurisdiction should be revised where necessary to accomplish this result.
'3.Common penalties found in these penalty statutes include forfeiture of
office (at least 52 statutes), a percentage penalty on overdue money due the state
(at least 40 statutes, the percentage varying widely), a fine of up to $100 (at least
75 statutes, minimum fines varying), a fine of up to $500 (at least 72 statutes, minimum fines varying), and a fine of up to $1,000 (at least 39 statutes, minimum
'fines varying).
4. § 559.140, RSMo 1969, provides:
Persons convicted of manslaughter shall be punished by imprisonment in
the penitentiary for iot less than two nor more than 10 years, or by imprisonment in the county jail not less than six months, or by a fine not
less than five hundred dollars, or by both a fine not less than one hundred
dollars and imprisonment in the county jail not less than three months.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss4/1
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"misdemeanor," without specifying a penalty, is a penalty type authorized
for 353 crimes. 5
A "penalty provision" is simply a statutory provision that authorizes
a specific punishment for a specified crime or crimes. All identical "penalty

provisions" make up a penalty type.
There are 280 different penalty types for the 964 criminal penalty
provisions authorizing imprisonment as a maximum sentence for felonies
and misdemeanors. In addition, there are over 108 different penalty types
for the 625 penalty provisions authorizing a fine or forfeiture as a- maximum sentence.8
Table I divides Missouri penalty types for felonies into five groups.
After each defined group, Table I shows the number of penalty provisions
within that group, followed by the number of penalty types, such provisions authorize and the number of different maximum penalties author7
ized within the group.
TABLE I
FELONY PENALTIES, PENALTY TYPES AND MAXIMA
IN FIVE PENALTY-TYPE GROUPS
Number of
Penalty
Provisions
Within Group

Group Description
1. Imprisonment up to life,
or death
...................
2. Imprisonment 20 years or more,
less than life ..................
3. Imprisonment over 10 years, less
than 20 years ..................
4. Imprisonment over 5 years to
10 years .................
...

28

Number of
Penalty
Types*
within Group

Number of
Different
Maximat
within Group

13

2
-

13

9

5

2

2

1

47

5. Imprisonment for 5 years or less .. 182

13

7

.72

13

Total .................... 272

109

28 (21)t

*E.g., 7 years to life; not more than 7 years; etc.
tE.g., life; death; 30 years; $5,000 fine;.etc. The same penalty provision may contain alternative maxima.
tEliminating duplication of maxima among different groups, which sometimes results from alternative maxima for specific crimes, there are 21 different kinds of
felony maxima.
Table II divides Missouri penalty types for misdemeanors punishable
by a maximum penalty of imprisonment into three groups, following the

same approach as Table I.
5. § 556.270, RSMo 1969.
6. After identifying 108 different penalty types in 450 of the 625 provisions,
the task of identifying other penalty types, often based on only slight differences
in different combinations of minimum and maximum penalties, became so tedious
the author gave up in disgust. Anyone interested in completing such a study
should use a computer.
7. For an interesting comparison with the Missouri figures see- the statistics
in Beckett, Criminal Penalties in Oregon, 40 ORE. L. Rav. 1, 8 (1960). The Oregon
study revealed 466 penalty types for 1,413 penalty provisions.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1973
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TABLE II
MISDEMEANOR PENALTIES, PENALTY TYPES AND MAXIMA
IN THREE PENALTY-TYPE GROUPS
Number of
Number of
Number of
Different
Penalty
Penalty
MaximaO
Types
Provisions
Group Description
within Group
within Group
within Group
1. Imprisonment up to 1 year
in jail ........................ 535
80
10
2. Imprisonment over 30 days, less
than I year .................... 135
73
12
10
22
18
3. Imprisonment 30 days or less ....
Total within all groups ....

692

171

32(24)

*E.g., up to 1 year, or 6 months, or $1,000, $500, $100, etc.
The totals of Table I and Table II reveal an average of slightly more
than three penalty provisions per penalty type. The legislature has frequently used unique penalty provisions and only infrequently used the same
penalty type more than a few times.8 Almost 90 percent of the 280 penalty
types are used no more than three times; sixty percent are used only once.
Conversely, one penalty type for "statutory misdemeanors" is used 353 times
and has been applied to many crimes for which a lesser penalty would be
sufficient. 9
8. A few penalty types are found numerous times. The table below shows
the frequency or repetition in penalty type use.
TABLE III
NUMBER OF USES PER PENALTY TYPE
Number of Times the Penalty
Type Is Used

Number of
Penalty Types
So Used

Total Penalty
Provisions Created

I .................................. 169
2 .................................. 53
3 .................................. 26
4 .................................. 16
5 ..................................
1
6 ..................................
2
7 ..................................
3
8 ..................................
1
9 ..................................
1
10 or more .........................
8

169
106
78
64
5
12
21
8
9
4920

Total .......................... 280

964

*This includes 353 "statutory misdemeanors" (see note 2 supra) and 57 felonies
punishable by imprisonment of from 2 to 5 years. The other 6 penalty types are
used an average of 14 times apiece, but 3 of them are only slight variations of the
"statutory misdemeanor" penalty type.
9. By comparison, only 79 statutes include a maximum sentence of six
months in jail, the next most frequent type of misdemeanor maximum. Because of
widely varying minimum penalty and fine provisions, these 79 statutes contain 36
different penalty types.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss4/1
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Apparently the legislature has never comprehensively studied or revised
criminal penalties in Missouri. The excessive number of penalty types cannot be rationally defended. Having too many penalty types arguably reduces the deterrent effect of all penalties; many penalty types are not publicized sufficiently to give notice of their existence. Further, frequent use
of different minimum and maximum penalties may result in penalties that
are disproportionate to the crimes penalized and produce wide disparities
in sentencing for similar crimes. The legislature needs to adopt a classification system to aid in solving these problems.
B. The Code ClassificationSystem
The Proposed Code offers a remedy to this chaos of sentencing types
without sacrificing flexibility.' 0 Felonies are classified for purposes of sentencing into four categories, Classes A, B, C, and D. 11 Misdemeanors are
classified into three categories, Classes A, B, and C.12 Infractions, a new
class of offense not involving possible imprisonment and not considered
criminal, are not further classified.13 Each offense in the Code is graded
according to its seriousness and assigned to one of these penalty classes.
Similarly, all non-Code offenses are simply assigned to a proper penalty
4
class without being regraded.1
1. Felonies
A person convicted of a Class A felony may be sentenced to a term
of years not less than 10 years and not to exceed 30 years, or to life imprisonment.' 5 The court may fix any maximum term of years within the
range of 10 to 30 years if a life sentence is not considered appropriate. The
committee decided that no purpose is served by imposing a maximum term
of over 30 years, assuming that changes are not made in the parole system,
because the Board of Probation and Parole equates longer term sentences
with life sentences in determining parole eligibility.
A person convicted of a Class B felony may be sentenced to any term
of years not less than 5 years and not more than 15 years.1 6 This is the
normal range of imprisonment for very serious offenses for which a life
sentence would not be appropriate.
A person convicted of a Class C felony may be sentenced to any term
of years not less than three years and not more than seven years, and a
person convicted of a Class D felony may be sentenced to a term of three,
10. Authorities have concluded that the best method of assuring consistency
in penalties is to classify into relatively few penalty types, thereby forcing the legislature to examine carefully both crime and punishment in order to equalize penalties for crimes of similar gravity. ABA STANDARDS § 2.1 (d), comment at 52:53.
11. PROP. NEw Mo. CRIM. CODE § 2.020 (1973).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. § 2.030.
15. Id. § 3.010 (1) (a). No sentencing category is included for mandatory death
sentences. See Id. § 10.025 (App. 1973), Capital Murder.
16. Id.§ 3.010 (1) (b).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1973
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four, or five years. 1 7 The Class C maximum corresponds to the fourth
group, and the class D maximum corresponds to the fifth group of penalty
types in Table 1.18
Presently, many. "hybrid" Missouri felony statutes authorize both felony
and misdemeanor type penalties.' 9 Similarly, under the Proposed Code,
whenever a person is convicted of a Class C or D felony, the court may
decide that a term of years is not appropriate and imprison him for a "spedal term" not to exceed one year in the county jail or other authorized
penal institution. 20 If instead the court decides that imprisonment for a
term of years is appropriate, it must commit the person to the custody of
2
the Department of Corrections for a term of years not less than three years. '
The court may sentence any person convicted of a class C or D felony
to pay a fine not exceeding $5,000, or to pay an amount not exceeding
double the amount, of the offender's gain from the commission of the
crime.2 2 However, the Code generally discourages felony sentences of only
23
a fine.
a. Prison Term and Conditional Release Term
Under the Proposed Code 'the "prison term" (time actually spent in
prison) is calculated by subtracting a prescribed "conditional release 'term"
from the term of years imposed by the court.2 4 The Board of Probation and
Parole retains its authority to grant a parole during the prison term.
The "committee believes that all persons released from sentences of
terms of three years or more should be placed on parole or on "conditional
"

17. Id. § 3.010 (1) (c), (d).
18. The proposed 7-year maximum for Class C felonies roughly corresponds
to the 10-year maximum for many group 4 felonies because the Code presupposes
that the "three-fourths time rule" of § 216.355, RSMo 1969, will be repealed when
the Code is adopted. Under this rule the vast majority of prisoners today can serve
a 10 year sentence in 7.5 years, less further reductions for "merit time." See REPORT
OF BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE TO COMMITTEE To DRAFT A MODERN CRIMINAL

CODE at
to seven
ing note
19.

12-13 (March 22, 1971). Under the Proposed Code a prisoner sentenced
years might serve almost all of the sentence in prison; text accompany81 infra.
See, e.g., the manslaughter penalty statute, § 559.140, RSMo 1969, quoted

note 4 supra.
PROP. NEW Mo. CRIM. CODE § 3.010 (2) (1973)..
21. Id. It has been suggested that the shortest prison sentence during which.
any meaningful program of rehabilitation or reform could be expected to take
effect is three to four years. II WORKING PAPERS Or THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
REFORM or FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAws 1260 (1970). If the court imposes a 3.year
sentence under the Proposed Code, the' person sentenced ordinarily would spend

20.

18-months in prison and then serve a "conditional release" term of 18 months.
§ 3.010 (4) (1973). See text accompanying notes .24-32

PROP. NEW MO. CRim. CODE

infra.
22. PROP. NEw Mo. CRim. CODE § 5.010 (1973).
23. The "nature and circumstances" of a felony usually require a finding that
a fine alone will not "suffice for the protection of the public," Id. § 5.040 (2), and
a further finding that a fine is not 'uniquely adapted to deterrence of the type

of offense involved or to the -correction of the defendant," Id. § 5.040 (3).
24. Id. § 3.010 (4), quoted note 28 infra.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss4/1
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release." 25 At present, prisoners who are the worst parole risks are held the
longest; usually they are released without any parole supervision after
serving "flat time" in prison. 26 Under the Proposed Code, the worst parole
risks would continue to be held the longest; however, they would also be

given a "conditional release" at the end of their "prison term."
The Proposed Code includes this "conditional release term" in all
sentences of three years or more to ensure that control is maintained over
every prisoner after his release. 27 The term varies in length, depending
upon the seriousness of the crime and the length of the sentence actually
imposed. 28 Consequently, the worst offenders, who receive longer sentences, will have the longest period of parole supervision instead of the
shortest period or no supervision at all. The longest conditional release
29
term is 5 years; the shortest is 18 months.
If a person serving his conditional release term commits another crime
or otherwise violates a condition of his release, he may be treated as a
parole violator and the conditional release term may be revoked by the
Board of Probation and Parole. 30 Upon revocation of a conditional release
term, the remainder of that term becomes an additional prison term.3

1

Of

course, the Board of Probation and Parole might be convinced that the
25.

PROP. NEW Mo. CRIM. CODE § 3.010 (4) (b) (1973) provides:
"Conditional Release" means the conditional discharge of a prisoner by
the Department of Corrections subject to conditions of release that the
State Board of Probation and Parole deems reasonable to assist the offender
to lead a law-abiding life, and subject to the supervision under the State
Board of Probation and Parole. It shall be a condition in each case that the
offender not commit another crime, federal or state, during the term of
conditional release.
26. In 1970, 765 persons were paroled by the Board of Probation and Parole,
but 1009 prisoners were released by the Department of Corrections after having
served "flat time." Thus only 43% of all felons released in 1970 were released un-

der parole supervision. REPORT or BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE
TO DRAFT A MODERN CRIMINAL CODE at 4 (March 22, 1971).

TO COMMI1rEE

27. Note that as defined in note 25 supra, "conditional release" is very similar to parole and would involve a major commitment of parole supervision resources to prevent recidivism by offenders who pose the greatest risks of injury tothe public.
28. PRox. NEw Mo. Cium. CODE J 3.010 (4) (a) (1973) provides:
A sentence of imprisonment for a term of years shall consist of a prison
term and a conditional release term. The conditional release term of any
maximum term of years designated by the court shall be:

(i) one-third or eighteen months, whichever is greater, for maximum
terms of nine years or less;
(ii) three years for maximum terms between nine and fifteen years;
(iii) five years for maximum terms more than fifteen years, including
life imprisonment;
and the prison term shall be the remainder of such maximum term.

29. Id.
30. Id. § 3.050(5) (1973). If the prisoner is paroled before the end of his
prison term (before the start of the conditional release term) and his parole is

later revoked, he must serve, as an additional prison term, the remainder of the
prison term and, in addition, all of the conditional release term. Id.
31. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1973
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violator deserves another chance and grant a regular parole at some time
during the remainder of the additional prison term.
Obviously, the proposed system of "conditional release" for every felon
committed to the Department of Corrections will require greater public
expenditures for parole supervision. Yet, the committee believes that a
modest investment in conditional releases3 2 will lower the recidivism rate.
b. Extended Terms for Dangerous Offenders
The Proposed Code makes special provision for extended felony sentences for dangerous offenders. The basic provision 3 permits the court
to sentence the dangerous, mentally abnormal offender who commits a
Class B, C or D felony under certain aggravating circumstances to up to
double the maximum term for normal offenders. The criteria adopted for
identifying dangerous offenders are derived from the Model Sentencing
Act. 84 The court is not required to sentence a dangerous offender to an
extended term and cannot do so unless the formal charge notifies the defendant that the prosecution intends to ask for an extended sentence.83
Detailed extended term procedures providing constitutional safeguards are
32. The Board of Probation and Parole estimated that in order to provide
conditional
release supervision equivalent to parole supervision for the 1009
prisoners released
in 1970 after serving "flat -time" (see note 26 supra), an additional 22 parole officers would be required, assuming each carried a caseload of
50 offenders. .Also required would be a secretarial staff of 11 and a supervisory
staff of 3, plus housing, supplies, travel expenses, etc. REPORT OF BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE TO COMMITrEE TO DRAFT A MODERN CRIMINAL CODE at 5 (March
22, 1971). By rough estimate, the proposed conditional release system should not cost
over $500,000 per year.
33. PROP. Nxw Mo. Cium. CODE § 3.020 (1973) provides:
(1) Authorization. The court may sentence a person who has been convicted of a Class B, C or D felony to an extended term of imprisonment

if it finds
(a) the defendant is being sentenced for a felony in which he inflicted or attempted to inflict serious physical injury; or
(b) the defendant is being sentenced for a felony which seriously endangered the life or safety of another and the defendant has been
previously convicted of one or more felonies not related to the instant
crime as a single criminal episode; and
(c) in addition to finding the matters defined in (a). or (b) the
court finds that the defendant is suffering from a severe mental or
emotional disorder indicating a propensity toward continuing criminal activity of a dangerous nature. A finding of mental disease or
defect excluding responsibility is not required.
(2) Authorized Terms. The total authorized maximum terms of imprisonment for dangerous, mentally abnormal offenders are:
(a) for, a Class B Felony, a term of years not to exceed 30 years.
(b) for a Class C Felony, a term of years not to exceed 15 years.
(c) for a Class D Felony, a term of years not to exceed 10 years.
34. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, MODEL SENTENCING Aar
§.6 (rev. ed. 1970).
3A. . PROP. NEw Mo. CalM. CODE § 3.030 (2)(a) (1973) provides that notice
that the prosecution, intends to ask for an extended sentence under § 3.020 must
be contained in the indictment or iniformation and delivered to the defendant more
than 30 days prior to trial or guilty plea.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss4/1
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included in a special sentencing section of the Proposed Code, 36 because
normal sentencing procedures would not meet constitutional due process
37
requirements for imposing an extended term.
The committee found it difficult to draft criteria sufficiently detailed
to avoid possible abuse of the extended term authorization. 38 In order to
minimize potential for abuse the Proposed Code requires the state to prove
that "the defendant is suffering from a severe mental or emotional' disorder
indicating a propensity toward continuing criminal activity of a dangerous
3
nature." 9
Although the principle that legislation should distinguish between
ordinary and dangerous offenders has been approved by several authorities,40 the legislature should ask whether extended terms are needed. The
Proposed Code retains high upper limits for felony sentences in. the regular
provisions, 41 and dangerous felonies are ordinarily classified as Class A or
Class B felonies. The case for an extended term provision and special sentencing procedures would be much stronger if there were a substantial and
86. The Proposed Code provides for notice, a sentencing hearing, discovery
of all presentence and diagnostic reports, full rights of confrontation and crossexamination, a right to present evidence, and specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. Id. § 3.030 (2).
37. Cf. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
38. The committee rejected the major formulation in MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 7.03 (3) (Prop. Off. Draft 1962):

The defendant is a dangerous, mentally abnormal person whose commitment for an extended term is necessary for protection of the public.
The Court shall not make such a finding unless the defendant has
been subjected to a psychiatric examination resulting in the conclusions
that his mental condition is gravely abnormal; that his criminal conduct
has been characterized by a patttern of repetitive or compulsive behavior or
by persistent aggressive behavior with heedless indifference to. conse-

quences; and that such condition makes him a serious danger to others.
39. PROP. NEW Mo. CRis. CODE § 3.020 (1) (c) (1973), quoted note 33 supra.
40. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 7.03, .04 (Prop. Off. Draft 1962); NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRI-ME AND DELINQUENCY, MODEL SENTENCING ACr § 6 (rev. ed. 1970);
ABA STANDARDS 2.5 (1968).
41. Although the maximum penalties for many felonies were reduced somewhat,. a substantial majority of the committee members resisted extensive reductions in criminal penalties. Some penalties were even increased substantially; e.g.,
attempting a Class A or B felony, PROP. NE-w Mo. CRIM. CODE § 9.010 (3) (a), (b)
(1973). Conspiracy is a felony when the conspiracy is to commit a Class A, B or C
felony, Id. § 9.020 (8) (1973).
The present Missouri approach and the Proposed Code approach is typical in
American sentencing. ABA STANDARDS 2.5 (b) provides:

[M]any sentences authorized by statute in this country are, by comparison
to other countries and in terms of the needs of the public, excessively
long for the vast majority of cases. Their length is undoubtedly the product
of concern for protection against the most exceptional cases, most notably
the particularly dangerous offender and the professional criminal. It
would be more desirable for the penal code to differentiate explicitly
between most offenders and such exceptional cases, by providing lower,
more realistic sentences for the former and authorizing a special, term
for the latter ....
(emphasis added).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1973
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general reduction of maximum sentences authorized for most felonies in
42

the Proposed Code.

2. Misdemeanors
A person convicted of a Class A misdemeanor under the Proposed
Code may be sentenced to a definite term not to exceed one year in the
county jail or other authorized penal institution.4 3 The maximum fine
for a Class A misdemeanor is $1,000.44 Thus, the Class A misdemeanor
penalty type is basically the same as the "statutory misdemeanor" penalty
type under present law.4 5 Important changes are recommended, however.
In lieu of the maximum fine authorized for any class of misdemeanor, the
Proposed Code authorizes the court to sentence the person to pay an amount
not exceeding double the amount of the offender's gain from the commission of any misdemeanor.46 A corporation convicted of a Class A misdemeanor may be fined up to $5,000, with the alternative "double the gain"
fine also available for any misdemeanor conviction. 47 This should prevent
corporations from regarding misdemeanor fines as occasional costs of doing
business.
A person convicted of a Class B misdemeanor may be sentenced to a
definite term not to exceed six months; a person convicted of a Class C
misdemeanor may be sentenced to a definite term not to exceed 15 days.4 8
In addition to, or in place of, a jail sentence, 49 he may be fined not more
42. Id. The ABA Advisory Committee would not endorse any special terms
for dangerous offenders unless provision for such special terms were accompanied
by a substantial and general reduction of the terms available for most offenders.
The Advisory Committee believes this combined general reduction and extended
term approach would go a long way toward eliminating severe disparities in the
disposition of similarly situated offenders. Id. comment at 84.
43. PROP. Na-w Mo. CaM. CODE § 3.010 (1) (e), (3) (b) (1973).

44. Id. § 5.020 (1) (a) (1973).

45. See note 2 supra.
46. PROP. NEw Mo. Cim. CODE § 5.020 (2) (1973) provides:
In lieu of a fine imposed under Subsection (1) [covering all misdemeanor
degrees], a person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor or infraction
through which he derived "gain" as defined in Section 5.010 (3), may be
sentenced to a fine which does not exceed double the amount of gain
from the commission of the offense. An individual offender may be fined
not more than twenty thousand dollars under this provision.
47. Id. § 5.030 (1) (1973).
48. Id. § 3.010 (1) (f), (g) (1973).
49. The misdemeanor sections in the Proposed Code do not provide for
imprisonment only, or a fine only, or for both a fine and imprisonment, as many

present misdemeanor penalty provisions do. Instead, the Proposed Code provides:
Whenever any person has been found guilty of a felony or a misdemeanor
the court shall make one or more of the following dispositions of the
offender in any appropriatecombination. The court may:
(a) sentence the person to a term of imprisonment as authorized by
Chapter 3.
(b) sentence the person to pay a fine as authorized by Chapter 5.
(c) suspend the imposition of sentence, with or without placing the

person on probation.
(d) pronounce sentence and suspend its execution, placing the person
on probation.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss4/1
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than $500 for a Class B misdemeanor and not more than $300 for a Class C
misdemeanor.5 0 A corporation may be fined up to $2,000 for a Class B
misdemeanor and up to $1,000 for a Glass C misdemeanor.5 1
The Code contains general criteria for the imposition of fines, 5 2 authorizes installment or delayed payments,5 3 and limits the response to nonpayment of fines. 5 4 The court is given authority to revoke a fine previously
imposed under limited circumstances. 55 Although the Code recognizes the
need for fines in certain cases, it explicitly discourages the indiscriminate
56
imposition of fines in lieu of jail sentences.
3. Infractions
The creation of the new "infraction" classification is a significant
innovation. An infraction is a noncriminal offense. 5 An offense defined
(e) impose a period of detention as a condition of probation, as authorized by Section 4.040.
Id. § 2.010 (2) (emphasis added).
50. Id. § 5.020 (1) (b), (c).

51. Id. § 5.030 (1)(c), (d).

52. The Proposed Code provides:
General Criteria. In determining the amount and the method of payment of a fine, the court shall, insofar as practicable, proportion the fine
to the burden that payment will impose in view of the financial resources
of an individual. The court shall not sentence an offender to pay a fine
in any amount which will prevent him from making restitution or reparation to the victim of the offense.
Id. § 5.040 (1).
53. Id. § 5.040 (4).
54. The Proposed Code prohibits imprisonment for nonpayment, unless the
offender's default was attributable to an intentional refusal to obey the sentence,
or to a failure to make a good faith effort to obtain the funds for payment. The
maximum term of imprisonment for such contempt of court in the case of nonpayment of a misdemeanor fine is 30 days. Id. § 5.050.
55. The Proposed Code provides:
A defendant who has been sentenced to pay a fine may at any time petition
the sentencing court for a revocation of the fine or any unpaid portion
thereof. If it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the circumstances
which warranted the imposition of the fine no longer exist or that it would
otherwise be unjust to require payment of the fine, the court may revoke
the fine or the unpaid portion in whole or in part or may modify the
method of payment.
Id. § 5.060.
56. The Proposed Code provides:
When any other disposition is authorized by statute, the court shall not
sentence an individual to pay a fine only unless, having regard to the
nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and character
of the offender, it is of the opinion that the fine alone will suffice for
the protection of the public.

Id. § 5.040 (2). A fine often has an uncertain impact; for example, it may hurt
the offender's dependents more than the offender. Unless a fine is uniquely
adapted to deterrence of the type of offense involved or to the correction of the
offender, it ordinarily will not suffice for the protection of the public. See Id.
§ 5.040 (3) (1973).
57. PRop. NEw Mo. CRAm. CODE § 1.040 (2) (1973) provides:
An infraction does not constitute a crime and conviction of an infraction
shall not give rise to any disability or legal disadvantage based on conviction of a criminal offense.
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by the Code or in any other Missouri statute is an infraction "if it is so
designated, or if no other sentence than a fine, or fine and forfeiture or
other civil penalty is authorized upon conviction."5' 8 The purpose of the
infraction classification is to give the courts and legislature some flexibility
in dealing with a large group of offenses50 not properly called crimes. These
so-called "public welfare offenses" are ordinarily created in order to use
fines as a means of regulating conduct.8 0 Strict liability for violation of
most public welfare statutes means that no moral condemnation is involved;
therefore, conviction of an infraction does not constitute a crime and does
"not give rise to any disability or legal disadvantage based on conviction
of a criminal offense." 61
A person convicted of an infraction will be subject to a maximum
penalty of a -fine which may not exceed $200.62 In lieu of the maximum
58. Id. § 1.040 (1).
59. See note 6 and accompanying text supra. There are numerous different
minimum and maximum fines authorized among the 108 penalty types discovered.
A list of the various maxima shows how difficult it would be to establish subclasses of infractions: $1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $8, $10, $20, $25, $50, $90, $100, $150,
$200, $250, $300, $400, $500, $1,000, $1,500, $2,000, $3,000, $5,000, $10,000.
Among 92 penalty types identified authorizing a fine only, or a fine and forfeiture, 47 penalty types authorize a maximum fine of $300 or less. These 47 penalty types contain almost half of the penalty provisions in the group of 92
penalty types. Another 13 penalty types were found in the over $300 to $500 maximum fine range. Adding these penalty provisions shows that 60 of the 92 penalty
types contain about 60% of the total number of penalty provisions authorizing
only a fine, or a fine and forfeiture. Section 5.020 (i) authorizes a maximum
fine of $200 for infractions. Obviously, the fine is a compromise that would give
the sentencing court sufficient flexibility to deal with the vast majority of offenses that should be classified as infractions. In many cases where a larger fine
is now authorized by law, the court will be able to impose a fine larger than
$200 by determining how much the offender gained by commission of the infraction. If an offender is not likely to "gain" from the commission of an offense
now punishable only by a very large fine, the legislature should consider making
the offense a Class C misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of up to $300 and/or
imprisonment up to '15 days.
60. If the effective 'regulation of conduct requires the availability of an
imprisonment alternative, e.g., when many persons committing the offense are
likely to be indigent, the legislature should not hesitate to classify the offense as
a Class C misdemeanor.
61, PROP. NEw Mo. CIaM. CODE § 1.040 (2) (1973). Chapter 6 of the Proposed
Code defines the collateral consequences of conviction of a crime, including forfeiture of public office, disqualification from holding public office, and disqualification from voting and jury service. All disqualifications and disabilities not
necessaiily -incident to the 'execution of* the criminal sentence must be listed
under, the Proposed Code approach. This avoids 'the confusion that has developed
under. the -'present approach and provides -a better basis for rehabilitation- of offenders. "

'

'

.

'.

..

62. Id. § 5.020 (1) (d) (1973). In addition, the Proposed Code provides:
Whenever ariy person has been found guilty of an infraction, the court
shall make one or more of the following dispositions of the offender in
any appropriate combination. The court may:
'(a) sentence the person to 'pay a fine as authorized by Chapter 5.
(b) suspend the imposition of sentence, with or without placing the person on probation.
(c) pronounce sentence and guspend its execution, placing the person on
probation.
Id. § 2.010 (3).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss4/1
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fine, the court may sentence the person to pay an amount not exceeding
double the amount of his gain from the commission of the infraction. 6 . A
corporation convicted of an infraction may be fined up to $500, with the
alternative "double the gain" fine also available. 64
4. Offenses Outside the Code
Although the Proposed Code contains a general codification of Missouri criminal law, many criminal and quasi-criminal statutes have not been
included. It would be inconvenient and undesirable to move offenses into
the Code which have relevance only to the chapters in which they are
presently located. 65 Moreover, the committee did not attempt to revise
the law in some areas. 66
To cover these omissions, the Proposed Code provides:
Offenses defined outside of this Code and not repealed shall remain in effect, but unless otherwise expressly provided or unless
the context otherwise requires, the provisions of this Code shall
govern the construction and punishment for any such offenses
committed after the effective date of this Code as well as the construction and application of any defense to a prosecution for such
offenses.0 7
This section and the general sentencing section on classification of offenses
outside the Proposed Code6s help carry out the reform effort of integrating
and systematizing all offenses.
63. Id. 5.020 (2).
64. Id. § 5.030 (1) (e), (f).
65. Potential violators of the many regulatory statutes scattered throughout
the Missouri Revised Statutes should not have to search in two places-in the
regulatory chapter and also in a miscellaneous chapter of the Criminal Code-in
order to find applicable regulatory offenses. Usually such offenses are not felonies,
most of which are found in the Proposed Code.
66. E.g., election offenses and traffic offenses are not included in the Proposed Code.
67. PROP. NE-w Mo. CRIM. CODE § 1.060 (2) (1978) (emphasis added).

68. The Proposed Code states:
(1) Felonies. All offenses defined outside this Code for which imprisonment in a state correctional institution is authorized are classified and shall
be treated as Class D Felonies, with the following exceptions:
Section 195.200-1 (1), (2), (8), (4) and (5) RSMo 1969; and Section
195.270 RSMo 1969.
(2) Misdemeanors and Infractions. Any offense defined outside this Code
which is declared by law to be a misdemeanor without specification of
the penalty therefor is a Class A Misdemeanor. If the authorized imprisonment
for an offense defined outside this Code exceeds six months
in jail,specified
the offense
shall be treated as a Class A Misdemeanor;
if such authe
offense
shall be treated
thorized
imprisonment
exceeds a30Class
daysB but
is not more ifthan
months,
Misdemeanor;
suchsix
authorized

imprisonment is 30 days or less, the offense shall be treated as a Class C
Misdemeanor; if there is no authorized imprisonment, either in the statute

defining the offense or in an applicable sentencing statute outside this
Code, the offense shall be treated as an infraction.
Id. §2.00.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1973

13

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 4 [1973], Art. 1
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

A constitutional notice problem may appear to exist in the case of any
non-Code offense with an authorized penalty which is less than the maximum authorized penalty of the Code sentencing class to which it is as-

signed. The Code provides a temporary solution to this problem by providing that the term of imprisonment or fine actually imposed shall not
exceed the maximum imprisonment or fine authorized by the statute outside the Code, even though that statute is assigned to a Code penalty class
with a higher maximum penalty. 69 Ultimately the legislature should solve
the problem by specifically assigning each non-Code offense to a particular
70
Code sentencing class.
III.

APPELLATE REvIEW OF SENTENCES

Following the ABA Standards Relating to Appellate Review of Sentences,7 ' the Proposed Code authorizes appellate review of sentences. At
present there is no provision in Missouri law authorizing sentencing review
and Missouri appellate courts have shown no desire to construe their general authority to review criminal judgments to include such authority. If
a sentence does not exceed the maximum penalty authorized for the particular crime committed, a defendant subjected to harsh punishment has almost no chance of successfully appealing on the ground that the sentence
is excessive. 72 Missouri appellate courts will not even examine the merits
of an allegedly excessive sentence unless there is clear evidence that "passion or prejudice" of the sentencing court or jury affected the sentence, 78
69. Id. § 2.030 (3). There is a related conceptual problem created in cases of
non-Code offenses punishable by a larger fine or longer term of imprisonment
than is authorized by the corresponding Code sentencing class. For example, if an
offense outside the Code is punishable solely by a fine, it is punishable under the
Code by a fine that may not exceed $200 or double the "gain" from commission
of the offense, even though the non-Code penalty provision authorizes a much
greater fine. For a discussion of the problem and a suggested solution, see note 59
supra.

70. Another alternative would be to provide that a fine or sentence of imprisonment for an unclassified offense outside the Proposed Code shall be fixed
by the court in accordance with the sentence authorized in the statute that defines the crime. However, this would leave many of these offenses with substantially greater or lesser penalties than those provided in the Proposed Code for
equivalent grades of offense. See note 59 supra.
71. ABA STANDARDS RELATING To APPELLATE REvIEW OF SENTENCES 1.1 (Approved Draft, 1968) recommends:
(1) In principle, judicial review should be available for all sentences
imposed in cases where provision is made for review of the conviction....
(2) Although review of every such sentence ought to be available, it
is recognized that it may be desirable, at least for an initial experimental
period, to place a reasonable limit on the length and kind of sentence that
should be subject to review.
72. See, e.g., State v. Rapp, 412 S.W.2d 120, 125 (Mo. 1967); State v. Wolfe,
343 S.W.2d 10, 16 (Mo. En Banc 1961) (death penalty for statutory rape affirmed
because within range prescribed by statute).
73. If there is evidence of passion or prejudice on the part of the judge or
jury imposing a sentence, the failure of the trial judge to reduce the sentence
will be treated as an issue on appeal. State v. Rizor, 353 Mo. 368, 182 S.W.2d 525

(1944); State v. McGee, 336 Mo. 1082, 83 S.W.2d 98 (1935). The appellate
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss4/1
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or that the sentence is so extreme that it is arguably "cruel and unusual" in
the constitutional sense.7 4
Appellate courts in this country generally deny that they have the
power to review sentences in the absence of statutory authority. Many old
Missouri cases go farther by saying that fixing punishment for crime is a
legislative and not a judicial function; thus, when punishment is assessed
within the legislative limits, it cannot be adjudged excessive. 75 Occasionally,
when the sentence has appeared excessive the appellate court has suggested that executive clemency is available as a possible remedy. 76 Alternatively, where the sentence is grossly excessive 77 the appellate court may reverse on other grounds that would otherwise be dismissed as harmless error.
Even though it is sometimes said that sentencing is a legislative function, limited discretionary judicial review of jury sentences and misdemeanor sentences by the trial judge is now authorized in Missouri by statute.78 When the court sentences in felony cases no review is available. But
in misdemeanor cases the provision for trial de novo in circuit court after
conviction and sentence in magistrate court can be used to seek revision
of an allegedly excessive sentence.7 9 Thus, trivial sentences can be reviewed as of right in another court, but review of felony sentences is limited
standard for reducing the sentence on this ground is that "passion and prejudice
so dearly appear from the record that we may confidently say that the trial
court abused its discretion when it declined to reduce the punishment ....

."

State v. Laster, 365 Mo. 1076, 1083, 293 S.W.2d 300, 305 (En Banc 1956).
Mere assertion of excessiveness presents nothing for appellate review. State v.
Ransburg, 466 S.W.2d 691 (Mo. 1971).
74. Excessiveness of sentence could be made an issue in a death penalty or
other very severe penalty case under Mo. CONsT. art. I, § 21 or U.S. CONsT. amend.
VIII, State v. French, 318 Mo. 619, 300 S.W. 793 (1928).
75. E.g., State v. McGee, 336 Mo. 1082, 83 S.W.2d 98 (1935); State v.
Copeland, 335 Mo. 140, 71 S.W.2d 746 (1934); but see State v. Rizor, 353 Mo.
368, 374, 182 S.W.2d 525, 529 (1944) (legislative function to fix limits, primarily
jury function to assess punishment).
76. E.g., State v. Laster, 365 Mo. 1076, 1083, 293 S.W.2d 300, 305 (En
Banc 1956) (suggests that any relief because of inequality must come through
clemency).
77. See ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCEs 1.2,

comment at 30 (Approved Draft 1968) and authorities therein cited.
78. § 546.430, RSMo 1969, provides:
The court shall have power, in all cases of conviction, to reduce the extent
or duration of the punishment assessed by a jury, if in its opinion the conviction is proper, but the punishment assessed is greater than, under the
circumstances of the case, ought to be inflicted.
Unfortunately, trial court review of jury sentences does not promote the develop-

ment and application of criteria for determining when punishment is excessive,
one of the benefits of appellate review. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE
RE IEW OF SENTENCES 1.2 (iv) (Approved Draft 1968). Also, since Missouri appellate
courts hold that a sentence is not excessiveand subject to review unless there is

clear evidence of passion and prejudice (see note 73 supra) and that it is primarily
the jury's function to assess punishment (State v. Rizor, 353 Mo. 368, 374, 182
S.W.2d 525, 529 (1944)), it is doubtful that a trial judge feels obliged to re-

duce a jury sentence, although it is much more severe than he would have imposed.
79. § 543.290, RSMo 1969; Mo. Sup. CT. R. 22.10, 22.16.
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to review by the trial judge and then only in cases wherein the jury originally assessed the punishment.8 0
The Proposed Code provides that all felons who are sentenced to confinement after a trial can appeal as of right on the issue of excessiveness. 8 1

A person sentenced to confinement after pleading guilty to a felony or
misdemeanor, or after a trial in a misdemeanor case, may petition the appropriate appellate court for leave to appeal on the ground that the sentence is excessive. 82 Sentences to pay a fine or to serve a term of probation
are not appealable.
Under the Proposed Code "Eain appellate court reviewing a sentence may reduce it on the ground that the sentence imposed was greater
than, under the circumstances of the case, ought to be imposed; or the
court may set the sentence aside for further proceedings in the sentencing
court."88 The committee decided that appellate courts should not be permitted to increase any sentence,8 4 although some committee members
argued that granting such authority would tend to deter the filing of frivolous sentencing appeals. The committee believes that the proposed limitations on the right to appeal and the broad discretionary power of the
appellate courts to deny leave to appeal will effectively prevent a flood
of frivolous appeals.
The Proposed Code authorizes the supreme court to adopt rules and
procedures for the review of sentences.8 5 The ABA Standards Relating to
Appellate Review of Sentences provides excellent guidelines for the court to
follow in drafting such rules.88
Appellate review of sentencing in Missouri would encourage the development of uniform sentencing policies, provide a means of correcting
80. The probability that the power to decrease a jury sentence is exercised
very infrequently (see note 78 supra) means that at present there is almost no way
"to correct the sentence which is excessive in length, having regard to the nature
of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public
interest." ABA

STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES

(Approved Draft 1968).

1.2 (i)

81. PROP. NEw Mo. CRiM. CODE § 2.070 (1) (1973).
82. Id.

83. Id. § 2.070 (2).
84. ABA

STANDARDS

RELATING TO APPELLATE REvIEW or SENTENCES

3.4 (Ap-

proved Draft 1968) recommends:
(a) No reviewing court should be empowered to impose, or direct the
imposition of, a sentence which results in an increase over the sentence
imposed at the trial level.
(b) On remand for the purpose of re-sentencing the offender, no sentencing court should be empowered to impose a sentence which results
in an increase over the sentence originally imposed.
Noting that the question of whether the reviewing court should be authorized
to increase the penalty is perhaps the most controversial question involved in the
decision to provide for sentence review, the Advisory Committee discusses the
various arguments in detail. Id. comment at 55-63.
85. PROP. NEw Mo. GUM. CODE § 2.070 (3)(1973).
86. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REvIEw

proved Draft 1968).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss4/1
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excessive or disparate sentences, and cause trial and appellate courts to
explicitly consider the justification for particular sentences. The Proposed
Code provisions provide a sound basis for achieving these goals.
IV.

PROBATION

No legislative definition or classification of offenses can take account of all contingencies. However right it may be to take the
gravest view of an offense in general, there will be cases comprehended in the definition where the circumstances were so unusual,
or the mitigations so extreme, that.., probation would be proper.
We see no reason to distrust the courts upon this matter or to fear
that such authority will be abused.8 7
The drafters of the Model Penal Code thus described the basis for a broad
general provision authorizing probation as one of the alternatives available to a sentencing court.88 The Proposed Code follows their lead:
The court may place a person on probation for a specific period
upon conviction of any offense or upon suspending imposition of
sentence if, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the
offense and to the history and character of the defendant, the court
is of the opinion that
(1) institutional confinement of the defendant is not necessary for the protection of the public; and
(2) the defendant is in need of guidance, training or other
assistance which, in his case, can be effectively administered
through probation supervision.89
Although the Proposed Code states no preference for probation, some
members of the committee believe that probation should presumptively be
the disposition of an offender absent good reasons indicating that imprisonment is necessary. 0
The Proposed Code follows the existing law9 1 and the ABA Standards
Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedure92 in authorizing maximum probation terms of five years for felonies and two years for misdemeanors and a minimum probation term for felonies. 93 The Proposed
87. MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.02, Comment at 13-14 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
88. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.02 (Prop. Off. Draft 1962) with the
broad sentencing alternatives provision in PROP. NEw Mo. CRmI. CODE: § 2.010 (2)

(1973), quoted note 49 supra.

89. PROP. Nrw Mo. Cms. CODE § 4.010 (1973). Present § 549.071, RSMo 1969,

permits probation of "any person of previous good character" sentenced to confinement when the court is satisfied that the defendant, "if permitted to go at
large, would not again violate the law."
90. Preference for probation is recommended in MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01
(Prop. Off. Draft 1962) and ABA STANDARDS 2.2.

91. § 549.071, RSMo 1969.
92. ABA

STANDARDS 2.5 (b).

93. § 549.071, RSMo 1969.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1973
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Code departs from existing law in so far as it provides for a six-month
minimum probation term for misdemeanors, and authorizes six months to
one year of probation for infractions.9 4 The minimum limits allow sufficient time for rehabilitative programs to take effect or to determine if
the offender can rehabilitate himself -without supervision.
Although some new codes contain a list of standard conditions of
probation, the Proposed Code is flexible: "[t]he conditions of probation
shall be such as the court in its discretion deems reasonably necessary to
insure that the defendant will not again violate the law."9 5 Each probationer must be given a certificate containing the conditions on which he
is being released in order to avoid misunderstanding and to provide a
basis for probation revocation hearings. 96 The court may at its discretion
modify or enlarge the conditions at any time prior to the expiration or
97
termination of the probation term.
A major innovation in the Proposed Code is the provision allowing
imposition of a detention term as a condition of probation.9s Also known
as the "split sentence" provision, it permits the court to impose the shock

of a relatively short-term imprisonment as a prelude to a much longer
probation period. In misdemeanor cases the maximum period of "split
sentence" detention is 60 days; in felony cases the maximum period is 180

days. 9 9 Availability of such detention is a very important rehabilitative tool,
particularly in felony cases or in cases involving young offenders where the
94. PROP. Nmv Mo. Cwu:. CODE § 4.020 (1)(b), (c) (1973).
95. Id. § 4.030 (1). Present § 549.071, RSMo 1969, provides less guidance,
providing that the court may "place the defendant on probation upon such conditions as the court sees fit to impose."
96. Id. Comment.
97. Id. § 4.030 (2).
98. Id.
When probation is granted the court, in addition to conditions imposed
under Section 4.030, may require as a condition of probation that the defendant submit to a period of detention in an appropriate institution at
whatever time or intervals within the period of probation, consecutive
or nonconsecutive, the court shall designate.
(1) In misdemeanor cases, the period of detention . . . shall not

exceed the shorter of 60 days or the maximum term of imprisonment
authorized for the misdemeanor ....
(2) In felony cases, the period of detention . . .shall not exceed 180

days.
(3) Time spent in custody under a detention condition of probation
shall be deducted from the maximum prison or jail term if probation is revoked and the defendant serves a term of imprisonment.
Id. § 4.040.
99. Id. The Board of Probation and Parole recommended a 90-day maximum
"shock treatment" detention period on the ground that if a person "has not re-

ceived sufficient shock in 90 days (maximum) this person will not usually be
shocked in a longer period of time." REPORT OF BoAaD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE
17 (March 22, 1971). The
PROP. FED. CRIM. CODE § 3103 (Study Draft 1970) recommended a maximum of
60 days, but the PROP.Fm. Canm. CODE § 3106 (Final Draft 1971) recommends a 6month maximum detention period.
TO COMMTrrEE TO DRAXT A MODERN CRIMINAL CODE at
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court believes that some imprisonment is necessary, but that long-term im-

prisonment would be undesirable. 100
The "split sentence" provision also allows intermittent detention as a

condition of probation.o' This would give all Missouri sentencing courts
"work release" authority. 0 2 For example, the court could require an offender to serve nights or weekends in jail, while continuing to work to
support himself and his family. 03
Probation granted under the Proposed Code may or may not be a
"sentence" because the Code, as well as present law, authorizes the court
to suspend imposition of any sentence and still place the offender on probation. 0 1 Because an offender may be required to submit to a period, or
intermittent periods, of detention as a condition of probation, a court suspending imposition of sentence and putting an offender on probation could
indirectly impose short-term imprisonment without sentencing. Thus, if
the offender successfully completes his probation term, he will have no
record of having been convicted or sentenced to imprisonment. Nor will
he suffer any collateral consequences of conviction.10 5 If this flexibility in
the proposed probation law is properly used, it should reduce the need for
legislation authorizing removal of collateral consequences or expungement
of records of conviction. 0 6
V.

COURT VERSUS JURY SENTENCING

This review of sentencing under the Proposed Code would not be
complete without discussion of the changed roles of the court and jury in
sentencing. The Proposed Code provides:
100. The Board of Probation and Parole learned that in jurisdictions that have
used short term detention as "shock treatment" the rate of success measured by
reduction in recidivism has been phenomenal. REPORT OF BoARD OF PROBATION AND
PAROLE TO CoMI~rEE TO DAFT A MODERN CRMINAL CODE 7 (March 22, 1971).
101. PROP. Nmv Mo. Cm.CODE § 4.040 (1973), quoted note 98 supra.
102. At present only persons sentenced to jail in first class counties under
charter government and counties containing first class cities may be allowed to
leave jail to continue employment or business, to attend an educational institution, to obtain medical treatment, or, in the case of a woman, to keep house and
attend'to the needs of her family. § 221.170, RSMo 1969. This type of legislation
usually has general application throughout states that have adopted it. See ABA
STANDARDS 2.4, comment at 76-77.
103. Recommended by ABA STANDARDS 2.4 (a) (ii). Other possibilities include
confinement for selected periods to a facility designed to provide educational or
other rehabilitative services. Id. 2.4 (a) (i). While the Proposed Code includes no
presumption in favor of probation or these forms of probation disposition (see
note 90 and accompanying text supra), a sentence involving partial confinement
ordinarily would be preferable to a sentence of total confinement. ABA STANDARDS
2.4 (c).
104. § 549.071, RSMo 1969; PROP. NEW Mo. Cmrm. CODE § 2.010 (2) (c) (1973),
quoted note 49 supra. Under present law, no person convicted under the Narcotic Drug Act, ch. 195, RSMo 1969, may receive a suspended sentence and be
placed on probation unless it is his first felony narcotic offense and it does not
involve selling, giving or delivering the drug. § 195.200 (4), RSMo 1969. The Proposed Code does not revise drug offenses and does not attempt to reclassify or redefine the penalties for certain Narcotic Drug Act felonies. Ppop. NEw Mo. CRnM.
CODE

§ 2.030 (1)(1973).

105. See PROP. Nmv Mo. CriM. CODE ch. 6 (1973).

106.bySee
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(1) Upon a finding of guilt upon verdict or plea the court and
not the jury shall decide the extent or duration of sentence or
other disposition to be imposed under all the circumstances, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and character of the defendant, and render judgment accordingly.
(2) In all jury trials the jury shall be informed of the range of
authorized terms which the court might impose after a jury finding of guilt.' 0 7
This provision, although basically conforming to the ABA Standards
Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures,0 changes Missouri law
substantially. Presently in most cases' 09 of conviction by jury trial "where
by law there is any alternative or discretion in regard to the kind or extent
of punishment to be inflicted, the jury may assess and declare the punishment in their verdict..
,,"10 Consequently, most authorities say that Missouri has a "jury sentencing system.""' The legislature, however, has created so many exceptions to jury sentencing that in the vast majority of
cases the court actually assesses and declares the punishment. Thus, Missouri has a "judicial sentencing system" whenever: (1) The jury fails to
agree upon or to declare the punishment;"12 (2) the jury assesses a punishment not authorized by law; 113 (3) the defendant pleads guilty or
waives a jury trial; 114 (4) the defendant has previously been convicted of
a felony;"15 or (5) the court determines that the punishment assessed by
the jury is greater than ought to be imposed under the circumstances and
reduces it.116

A fundamental issue during committee debates was whether the Proposed Code should abandon this "sometimes jury, usually judge sentencing
system" in favor of judicial sentencing. Ultimately the committee opted
for judicial sentencing,"17 but required that whenever the trial is to a jury,
107. PROP. NEW Mo. Cam . CoDE § 2.060 (1973).
108. ABA STANDARDS 1.1 recommends: "Authority to determine the sentence
should be vested in the trial judge and not in the jury." Most jurisdictions in this
country give the trial judge exclusive authority in sentencing. Id. comment at
43-44.
109. Where the defendant has previously been convicted of a felony the court
has exclusive sentencing authority. But see note 115 infra.
110. § 546.410, RSMo 1969; Mo. Sup. CT. R. 27.02 (emphasis added).
111. E.g., State v. Rizor, 358 Mo. 368, 374, 182 S.W.2d 525, 529 (1944)
(legislative function to fix limits, primarily jury functioL to assess punishment);
see Comment, A Review of Sentencing in Missouri: The Need for Re-evaluation
and Change, 11 ST. L.U.L.J. 69 (1966), criticizing jury sentencing.
112. § 546.440, RSMo 1969; Mo. Sup. CT. PL 27.03.
113. Id.
114. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 27.03.

115. § 556.280 (1), RSMo 1969. If the court finds insufficient evidence of the

alleged prior conviction, the jury determines punishment as in other cases.

§ 556.280 (2), RSMo 1969.

116. § 546.430, RSMo 1969, quoted note 78 supra; Mo. Sup. CT. R. 27.04.

117. At first there was substantial sentiment for retaining some type of jury

sentencing system, or a system in which the jury is informed of the range of penalhttps://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss4/1
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they must be informed of the potential range of punishment before they
reach their decision. This latter requirement was added to ensure the
jury would be aware of the serious consequences that could potentially
accompany a finding of guilt. 11 8 The committee decided that judicial sentencing would reduce sentencing disparity produced by unpredictable jury
sentences. 119 Also, the court is in the best position to receive information
concerning the defendant's background, character, and past criminal record. 120 Furthermore, only the court has the requisite knowledge and experience to interpret the material presented in a presentence report' 2 ' and
122
to tailor the punishment to fit the rehabilitative needs of each defendant.
Although there are allegedly certain advantages to jury sentencing, 128
it is difficult to imagine an ad hoc jury of laymen properly weighing the
goals of punishment 24t before assessing the sentence. Often juries tend
to overemphasize a felt need for retribution, ignoring rehabilitative needs
ties and recommends a sentence to the court. However, it was noted that in Missouri a defendant who probably would be placed on probation upon a plea of
guilty often will be sentenced to prison if he elects to stand trial because the jury
cannot impose probation and the judge usually defers to the jury's sentencing
verdict. See notes 78 and 80 supra; Comment, Jury Sentencing in Virginia, 53 VA.
L. REv. 968, 973-75 (1967). Permitting the jury simply to make a sentencing recommendation is not siguificantly different than complete judicial sentencing; Missouri judges already have authority to reduce jury sentences, but seldom do.
118. See PROP. Nrw Mo. CraM. CODE § 2.060 (1973), quoted in text accompanying note 107 supra. The provision for informing the jury about the range of
authorized terms is probably unique in Americark law. It represents a committee
compromise between strict judicial sentencing, with the jury supposedly deliberating solely about guilt but perhaps speculating about the punishment that the judge
might impose, and jury sentencing as it now exists in Missouri.
119. "Sentencing by a distinct jury at each trial is necessarily a guarantee of
significant disparity between sentences." ABA STANDARs 1.1, comment at 45.
120. Missouri and other states authorizing jury sentencing do not submit a
presentence report to the jury because much of its contents would be inadmissible
on the primary issue of guilt. Admitting evidence relevant only to the issue of
punishment often would be highly prejudicial. The committee opposes any bifurcated trial procedure involving a jury sentencing trial because it would be too
time-consuming and expensive. See Note, Statutory Structures for Sentencing Felons
to Prison, 60 COLUm. L. Rzv. 1134, 1156 (1960), which collects and discusses jury
sentencing statutes.
121. PROP. NEw Mo. CRaM. CODE § 2.040 (1973) follows Mo. Sup. CT. R.
27.07 (b) in requiring a presentence investigation and report whenever a probation
officer is available to the court, unless the court directs otherwise. The introduction of jury sentencing to take the place of common law judicial sentencing made
sense in the 1800s when there usually was little difference between the training
and intelligence of judges and jurors and when presentence investigations were
not conducted.
122. See ABA STANDARDS 7.1-7.5 for recommendations on the development of
sentencing criteria and the exposure of judges to rehabilitation developments and
techniques.
123. See ABA STANDARDs 1.1, comment at 44 for arguments favoring retention
of jury sentencing.
124. The accepted goals or theories of criminal punishment are retribution,
deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation. In recent years there has been a
growing recognition that the best protection for society is provided by rehabilitating
the offender, the goal least likely to be emphasized by a sentencing jury. Note,
Sentencing Felons to Imprisonment under the Kansas Criminal Code: The Need
for a Consistent Sentencing Policy, 10 WASHBURN L.J. 269 (1971).
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because they know little about the defendant.
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Racial and ethnic factors

are more likely to affect jury sentencing deliberations. Compromise quotient verdicts may result from combined jury deliberations on guilt and
126
punishment.
Adoption of a purely judicial sentencing system will not eliminate all
problems of sentencing. Sometimes judges are subject to political pressures.
Also, it is impossible for judges, as it is for jurors, to disengage their prejudices against certain types of offenders. There are, however, many ways
for judges to work together to develop criteria for the imposition of sentences and to otherwise attack the pervasive problem of sentencing disparity.12 7 Appellate review of sentencing will further the development of
sentencing criteria and insure they are implemented at the trial level.
If the legislature adopts the proposed judicial sentencing system it
will authorize the type of sentencing procedure now followed by most jurisdictions and supported by almost all authority on the subject.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Proposed Code sentencing system is designed to deal with the
major sentencing problems and deficiencies of present Missouri law. The
Proposed Code classifies all crimes for purposes of sentencing into eight
major categories, with an uncomplicated and uniform range of penalties
applicable to all crimes within each category. Offenses of like gravity are
assigned to the same sentencing category. The court will impose all sentences within the ranges of sentencing alternatives. Limited appellate review of sentences is authorized to promote the development of rational
sentencing criteria and to curb abuses of sentencing power. Flexible probation provisions will permit a broader range of dispositions consistent with
the protection of the public and the rehabilitation of the offender. These
major reforms in the sentencing system and other proposed changes not
discussed in this article provide a sound basis for adoption of the Proposed
Code and for the subsequent cooperation of agencies concerned with sentencing-the legislature, appellate courts, trial courts, and corrections agendes.
125. This is especially true in cases of heinous crimes, when the community is
seeking vengeance through criminal punishment. Id. at 270. Some authorities
argue that juries tend to place too much emphasis on deterrence through severe
punishment. E.g., Comment, supra note 111, at 70-71, which includes a comparative study of the length of judge and jury sentences in St. Louis. A survey by the
Atlanta Crime Commission showed that in Atlanta some first offenders received
heavier punishment through jury sentencing than hardened recidivists. PRESIDENVS
CorNmusIoN ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND AMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLXNGE oF ClRUM IN A FPEE Socaury 145 (1967). See Id. for a recommendation that

jury sentencing be abolished.

126. Comment, Jury Sentencing in Virginia, 53 VA. L. REv. 968, 986-87 (1967),
argues that jury sentencing may thus destroy the integrity of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard.
127. See ABA STANDARDS 7.1 to 7.5, which recommend various means of attacking sentencing disparity, including sentencing councils, sentencing institutes, orientation of new judges, regular visitation of facilities for custody and treatment,
and feedback of information and statistics about sentenced offenders.
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